Identity Cards Bill - Standing Committee D

[Mr. Jimmy Hood in the Chair]

Identity Cards Bill

Clause 19 - Use for purposes of public authorities etc.

Alistair Carmichael: I beg to move amendment No. 181, in clause 19, page 17, line 32, leave out paragraphs (a) to (f) and insert
‘where it is necessary in the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime’.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 65, in clause 19, page 17, line 33, leave out ‘prevention or’.
No. 66, in clause 19, page 17, line 34, leave out paragraph (c).
No. 67, in clause 19, page 17, line 37, leave out paragraph (d).
No. 68, in clause 19, page 17, line 41, leave out paragraph (e).
No. 69, in clause 19, page 17, line 43, leave out from ‘numbers’ to end of line 44.

Alistair Carmichael: Hon. Members will recall that, prior to the conclusion of our proceedings on Thursday, we dealt with amendments Nos. 178, 179 and 180. The matter before the Committee today under amendment No. 181 is broadly similar the issues raised by those amendments. It relates specifically to the powers given to the Inland Revenue and Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise or whatever the new formulation of that merged body is.
The point that I want principally to draw to the Committee’s attention is the breadth of those powers. I accept that the clause excludes the auditing data under schedule 1, but it gives powers in respect of substantial data and, as drafted, it gives Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs broader scope for accessing data than is strictly necessary. The form of words in the amendment are those used by the Government for clause 1. It is a probing amendment, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s response.

Edward Garnier: I rise to support amendment No. 181 and to speak to our amendments Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68 and 69, which would achieve by a process of salami slicing the same outcome as amendment No. 181. The further that we get into the Bill, the more horrific is the creeping nature of the powers that the Secretary of State will be accorded. Although the Minister of State has accepted  that we are discussing a Christmas tree of a Bill, the glaring nature of that description becomes more apparent as we turn its pages.
Clause 19(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may, without the individual’s consent, provide a person with information recorded in an individual’s entry”,
while subsection (4) deals with the provision of that information without consent to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It states:
“The provision of information not falling within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 is authorised by this section where the information is provided to the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs”—
and to quote paragraph (f) of the subsection, which I wish to highlight—
“for other purposes specified by order made by the Secretary of State.”
That is a classic example of the vague and impenetrable nature of the Bill. The Secretary of State, no doubt with some form of parliamentary scrutiny—but not much, as we know from experience—is enabled to do more or less what he likes, but we do not know his intentions.

Nick Palmer: In relation to amendment No. 65, which would remove the authority to seek information in connection with the prevention of crime, will the hon. and learned Gentleman give examples of crimes that he considers should not be prevented under the clause?

Edward Garnier: That question comes under the heading of a very clever but rather stupid intervention, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying so.

John Robertson: But it was a good one.

Edward Garnier: If the hon. Gentleman thinks that the intervention was a good one, he has convinced me that my rude remark was justified.

Tony McNulty: A rude remark can never be justified.

Edward Garnier: The Minister of State is correct—indeed, this is advice he will wish to take himself—that it is never appropriate to be rude.
Let me return to the purpose of the debate. As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) made clear on introducing this group of amendments, they are probing amendments that are designed to discover what on earth the Government intend. Of course, we can make witty remarks like the one that the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer) has just made, whichprovide us with a degree of amusement and diversion, but the serious pointis that the Bill provides the Secretary of State with creeping but unknown powers. That is what the Government and the hon. Gentleman need to address.
Does the hon. Gentleman think that it is right and justified that our constituents should be subjected to legislation that their representatives in Parliament cannot discover the limits of? That is a clumsy way of  putting it, but I hope that he understands my concern. I urge the Government to give us a rational and candid explanation of what they intend to happen under the relevant subsections.

Patrick Mercer: Following on from what the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) said, when amendments Nos. 65 to 69 were written several months ago, my colleagues and I puzzled over this part of clause 19 and could not understand why subsection (4) could not be simplified. If paragraph (a) were left in place, paragraph (b) were changed slightly and paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) were struck out, subsection (4) would be much simpler and easier to understand, and it would not lead—both speakers on the amendment have mentioned this—to any form of mission or identity creep.
I remember that, all those months ago during the first debate on this subject, we received no satisfactory explanation from the then Minister. I underscore the words of my hon. and learned Friend by asking the Government to explain why we need this measure. Is it not clear that if the clause were amended as we suggest—this takes into account the comments of the hon. Member for Broxtowe—it would assist the wording of the Bill? I might add that the explanatory notes on the clause are particularly unhelpful in this regard, and I should be grateful if the Minister could enlighten me.

Nick Palmer: I feel that the Opposition are getting away a little too easily with the repeated line that nonsensical amendments are all right because they are merely probing amendments. We should do the amendment justice by considering its content and debating it.
As the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) says, the combined effect of amendment No. 65 and the other Conservative amendments would be to reduce subsection (4) to the provision of information
“in the interests of national security”
and
“for purposes connected with the ... detection of crime”.
It would specifically exclude the provision of information for purposes connected with the prevention of crime.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough asked about our constituents’ views. I think that they would like to see crime not only detected, but prevented. Should he seek to withdraw his amendment, I will be inclined to oppose him, so that we can see whether he is prepared to go on the record as saying that the information should not be gathered.

Edward Garnier: I desperately want to help the hon. Gentleman, because he needs it. Even if his desire is genuine, I cannot seek to withdraw amendment No. 65, because it is not the lead amendment. If he wishes to stay here until 7, 8 or 9 o’clock on Thursday evening, however, we may vote on it. I am happy to meet him  in this Room to do that, but procedurally, the only amendment that can be dealt with now is amendment No. 181.

Nick Palmer: I am aware of the point that the hon. and learned Gentleman makes, but the Liberal Democrat amendment would have the same effects; the Conservatives are merely a little more blunt about them. It is perfectly proper that the Government should seek not only to detect crime, but to prevent it. That is a significant purpose of this Bill. The amendments are entirely wrong-headed.

Alistair Carmichael: The hon. Gentleman says that my amendment would have the same effect, but I refer him to what it says:
“where it is necessary in the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime”.
It would not have the same effect at all.

Nick Palmer: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. He is correct that the Conservative amendment is even more extreme than the Liberal Democrat one. Nevertheless, both amendments are fundamentally against the Bill’s purpose and they are not in line with what our constituents wish to achieve.

Andy Burnham: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hood. I also welcome back to the Committee the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron). I am just sorry that his stay in Cheadle was so successful.
We are considering amendments Nos. 181 and 65 to 69. As Members have pointed out, they relate to the provision of information without consent to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. The clause has to be read in conjunction with the rules for the provision of information, which are set out in clause 23. As a preface to responding in detail to the amendments, I must say that we are not talking about wholesale access to the database. People need to balance things. Perhaps the hon. and learned Member for Harborough will be so wise as to balance his somewhat overstated remarks and say that this is not about wholesale access for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, but about proportionate access to the basic identity details that are held on the register.
As Members will know, it is not as if the customs are operating in a vacuum at the moment. They have access to information relating to who might be currently under investigation. It is not as if we are talking about extending the arms or tentacles of government into entirely new areas and interfering into people’s private lives. The provision simply allows the benefits that the register provides to be extended to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the carrying out of its work. It is not horrific, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough suggested. That was just one example of his overstatement.

Edward Garnier: Perhaps the Under-Secretary could help me. What does subsection (4)(f) mean? It states:
“for other purposes specified by order made by the Secretary of State.”
What “other purposes” do the Government have in mind?

Andy Burnham: I shall come on to that. In responding to the amendments so far, I have sought to get some balance back into the argument. The hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether it was right and justified for our constituents to be subject to far-reaching legislation such as this. I take it that his constituents are taxpayers, like mine are. They all have an interest in Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs doing its work effectively and in ensuring that it can bear down on cases of fraud and tax evasion. If he has a problem with that, he needs to say so. If his objection is to the efficient running of Government agencies, that is not acceptable as a criticism of the Bill.

Edward Garnier: I do not want to keep jumping up and down, because listening to me correcting the Under-Secretary all the time would be tedious for everyone, but I should make the following point. We all have a general desire to prevent and detect crime, be it crime against the Revenue or the Treasury, or against the general criminal law. We do not have a joined-up approach across this Committee Room about how to give powers to the Secretary of State to run the identity register and the identity card system. That is what we are discussing. The Government would be advancing a false argument in suggesting that the Opposition do not approve of the detection and prevention of crime—of course we do. However, we are concerned about how the Government are giving themselves powers to do things that we cannot yet define.

Andy Burnham: I shall come on to address the amendments in detail. I was simply pointing out that from the tenor of some of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s remarks, it seems that he has little trust in any arm of the Government. We heard last week about rogue elements in the security services. I say to him that the powers that we are discussing are balanced. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is already carrying out investigations; the provisions would simply extend the benefits of the register to its work.
The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland was right to say that the amendments are not entirely the same. His amendment would restrict the provision of information to
“where it is necessary in the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime”.
Amendments Nos. 65 to 69 would restrict such provision further—to when it was necessary in the interests of national security or the detection of crime.
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is the new department responsible for the business of the former Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. Its law enforcement responsibilities are often undertaken jointly with the police, but it is also directly involved in the prevention and detection of crime. The customs side of the organisation is responsible for the  investigation and prosecution of crime, including major cases of drug trafficking, and the Revenue side also has an important role in law enforcement.
The hon. Member for Newark made a fair point in asking why the issue was not simplified and why the focus on those roles was not absolutely clear. Clause 19(4) is necessarily detailed so as to ensure that all the relevant Revenue and Customs functions are covered and that information from the national identity register can be provided to the organisation. Such information could, for example, concern the identity of a suspect and assist with the law enforcement functions of the Revenue and Customs.
The hon. Gentleman will know that the Revenue also deals with compliance, but the amendments would make it very difficult for it to use the national identity register to any real effect. Information from the register will increase the Revenue’s ability to direct its compliance work effectively. Without the possibility of making identity checks against the register, it would risk making payments to individuals who had made fraudulent claims. I do not believe that he would want that, and neither would we.
Recently, there have been cases of people claiming tax credits fraudulently, and that is an example of how identity fraud is becoming more and more common. Members on both sides of the House have an interest in ensuring that people who receive payments are entitled to them and are who they say they are. If the Revenue is to be able to do that, it is obviously important that it should have access to the register.

Alistair Carmichael: The distinction that the Under-Secretary draws between the compliance functions—as he sees it, these would be impaired by the amendments—and the other functions is not real. The fraudulent claiming of tax credits and everything else would surely be covered by the
“prevention or detection of serious crime”.

Andy Burnham: The functions of the merged agency apply widely. It provides payments to individuals through the tax credit system. The argument will be about whether that would extend to serious crime. I do not believe that it would in some cases. The organisation has wide-ranging responsibilities for enforcement—the collection of tax—and for providing benefits through the tax credit system. That is why the clause is drawn so widely.
Furthermore, the boundary between the civil and criminal work of the Revenue and Customs is necessarily complex. The disruption of Revenue fraud to prevent significant tax loss is a key element of the strategy for combating commercial fraud, such as that involving VAT and duty on tobacco, oils and alcohol. Although it may be possible to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators, part of the response in tackling serious tax fraud may be the use of civil procedures to frustrate the criminals and thereby prevent loss of revenue. For example, in missing trader VAT fraud, fraudulent VAT repayment claims can, in some cases, amount to millions of pounds. In such cases, Revenue and Customs may use civil procedures to recover the loss of tax.
Those civil procedures, which can be more effective than criminal proceedings in recovering funds, may include restraint orders where a debt has been established, the appointment of an insolvency practitioner and civil conspiracy proceedings. What links those civil disruption activities to criminal investigations is that both require timely and accurate intelligence for effective action to be taken. For those reasons, we want to be in a position to provide Revenue and Customs with access to information held on the national identity register that could help its investigations, whether or not it leads to a criminal prosecution.
For those reasons, paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (4) reflect the wide range of responsibilities held and work done by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. The order-making provision in paragraph (f), which would be removed by the amendment tabled by hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, as well as by the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, allows the circumstances referred to in subsection (4) to be extended in line with any additional work that might be allocated in the future to what is still a new department. We do not believe that it would right to have to do that through primary legislation.
Amendment No. 65 would allow the information to be provided only for purposes connected with the detection of crime. Under amendment No. 181, the provision of information is limited to purposes connected with serious crime. We think that those amendments would seriously constrain the legitimate use of the national identity register and the ID cards scheme. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is working in an increasingly intelligence-led arena, in partnership with some of the other agencies that we discussed in relation to the earlier provisions in the clause. It is right that its role in relation to crime is not just reactive, as my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe said. The phrase “prevention or detection of crime” is commonplace in legislation. It is not right to suggest that Revenue and Customs must wait until a crime has been committed before it can be provided with information from the register to help to identify a suspect.
There are also good reasons why we should not limit the provision of the information to cases involving serious crime. As I have said to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, Revenue and Customs deals with child benefit and tax credit fraud. An individual instance of those types of fraud may not appear to be serious crime, but it could be part of a serious organised fraud and, cumulatively, cases in which false identities are used could lead to a major loss of funds.
As I reassured the Committee at the outset, we are not talking about wholesale access to the register. Under existing law, Revenue and Customs can already access information held on individuals in the course of its investigations. We are talking about providing basic identity details. I do not believe that that is horrific or that my constituents would object to Revenue and Customs being given proportionate access to the national identity register. Coupled with  that, rules will be laid down in clause 23 about how requests will be handled. The Information Commissioner will provide further oversight. A further safeguard is that the provision of information must be necessary in the public interest, as defined in clause 1(4).
In the light of those assurances, the amendments are not necessary or desirable. They would restrict and limit the work of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. I urge the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland to seek leave to withdraw his amendment.

Alistair Carmichael: This has been an interesting teasing out of the issues. I shall take the Under-Secretary’s comments away with me when the House rises at the end of the week and consider them further. It seems that there are a number of internal contradictions in his argument. It also seems that, over the years, the Government, who seek to allow Revenue and Customs to operate in this way and to rely on civil penalties rather criminal prosecutions, allowed a certain laziness to creep into the way in which Customs and Excise, as it previously was, performed its duties. That became apparent to me in the course of a Select Committee investigation in relation to the imposition of strip stamps on spirits, of which I was a part. Nothing that the Under-Secretary said has persuaded me that that situation will change. By insisting on the wide definition in the clause, the Government somewhat undermine the purposes on which they themselves have placed so much stress. I do not know how one can reasonably construe clause 19 in a way that is consistent with the basic provisions that are clearly outlined in clause 1.

Andy Burnham: Clause 1(4)(e) states that one of the purposes is
“securing the efficient and effective provision of public services.”
I hope that the hon. Gentleman would accept that Revenue and Customs is engaged in precisely that activity.

Alistair Carmichael: I do not necessarily accept that. The range of issues for which Revenue and Customs would require access—what the Under-Secretary would call compliance issues—would be adequately covered by the first two paragraphs of clause 1(4):
“(a)in the interests of national security;
(b)for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime”,
which is what we are dealing with. I do not believe that the
“efficient and effective provision of public services”
is part of the work of an enforcement agency, which is, in essence, what Revenue and Customs is, as distinct from a service provision agency such as the health service or the Department for Work and Pensions.

Andy Burnham: I fully accept that Revenue and Customs may not be a popular organisation and that people may not want it to be able to do its work with ease and convenience, but the fact is that we all depend on the tax take for the health service and other organisations to work. Revenue and Customs carries out a crucial public service, and it should be aided and assisted in doing so.

Alistair Carmichael: The Under-Secretary does not do himself or the Committee any service by trying to misrepresent what we are discussing. Nobody is saying that Revenue and Customs should not be allowed to carry out its functions properly—that is certainly not what my amendment is about. My amendment seeks to achieve consistency in how access is allowed. Is he saying that Revenue and Customs should be allowed access to any information that it wants in any circumstances? That seems to be what he is saying now, although it contradicts what he said two or three minutes ago about proportionate access. I shall not misrepresent his position, and he should not try to misrepresent mine.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a Division. We are exploring for Revenue and Customs the same issue that we explored for other agencies in the debate on the previous string of amendments. I do not intend to detain the Committee further, but perhaps the issue would benefit from further scrutiny at a later stage. Accordingly, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in clause 19, page 17, line 45, leave out subsection (5).
In general terms, the arguments for this amendment, which seeks to delete subsection (5), were rehearsed in the last debate. The point that I wanted to make by introducing the amendment is that this is yet another example of desperate vagueness in a measure that will have a fundamental effect on the lives of our fellow citizens and on the relationship between the state and individuals.
Let us take one or two examples. Subsection (5) states:
“The provision of information not falling within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 is authorised by this section where the information is provided—
(a)to a prescribed government department, or
(b)to a prescribed Northern Ireland department”—
we do not yet know which Department in either case—
“for purposes”—
unspecified—
“connected with the carrying out of any prescribed functions”—
unspecified—
“of that department or of a Minister in charge of it.”
We know that the paragraph 9 information is the audit trail on the register, so the information under discussion does not fall within that audit trail. It strikes me that this is another example of Parliament being asked to give to the Government powers to do things that the Government cannot specify. It is a regrettable step.

Andy Burnham: We have covered some of this ground before, so I do not intend to detain the Committee too long. I understand where the hon. and learned Gentleman is coming from, and this debate is similar to the one that we have just had. It probably comes down to a basic difference of opinion about what we think the national identity register will be  useful for. It will enable the Government and public bodies to function more effectively in everybody’s interests.
Departments hold a range of personal identification information in different forms and on different databases. It is not as if that information is out of their reach; it is just that it may be held in different places and with discrepancies. The provision allows regulations to be made that would permit a Department, including a Northern Ireland Department, to be provided with information for the purposes specified.
I shall give the hon. and learned Gentleman some examples to reassure him that the provision is not desperately vague but a sensible measure that will help public administration. A provision could be made for the Department for Work and Pensions to receive information in connection with its fraud investigations. The provision might be used is to provide the Department for Constitutional Affairs with information to ensure that fines are issued to the correct person, or to provide information about addresses that might be helpful in tracking down individuals who have not paid fines. That is a real issue, and we all have an interest in seeing it addressed. If the national identity register can assist the courts in that process, it is sensible to introduce it.

Edward Garnier: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for giving way and for providing me with those examples. Perhaps he would care to consider clause 1 and where those examples fit in with the statutory purposes.

Andy Burnham: The matter is quite straightforward, and I urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to read the Bill before making such interventions. He is the lawyer, not me. [Interruption.] He has asked me a question, and I am about to give him the answer. If he does not like it, he should not ask the question. I repeat that clause 1(4)(e) says
“for the purposes of securing the efficient and effective provision of public services.”
The examples fit in there. Perhaps if he had read the Bill before intervening, he would not have done so.
A further example of how the measure might be used is to provide information to the Department of Health when a patient who is admitted to hospital cannot identify themselves. The provision of the information would allow the individual to be verified, and so aid the retrieval of medical records, although of course medical records would not be held on the register.
Subsection (5) does not authorise the provision of information within paragraph 9 of schedule 1. Members of the Committee can be assured of that. Any regulations would be subject to the negative procedure, and it is our intention that, as with all other cases where information is provided without consent, the arrangements would be subject to authorisation procedures and independent oversight. The procedures would be covered by the rules that we shall discuss in relation to clause 23. Further scrutiny would be provided by the commissioner, whose powers we will discuss in relation to clause 24.

Tobias Ellwood: There is concern about the many areas of vagueness. I appreciate that the Under-Secretary has given some good examples of how in these quite open clauses and subsections the measure might fit. He has given three examples: the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the national health service. Such bodies are not listed. There is huge concern among Opposition Members that many different questions and issues will be raised about the ways in which not only the register but the ID cards can be used, because of the general remit of clause 1(4)(e), which the Under-Secretary has just cited. Things can be justified by being said to come under the label of being for
“the efficient and effective provision of public services.”
If we are not firm about exactly how the register can be used, there is a worry in respect of a Government or Department—not necessarily this Government or any Department in particular. It could be argued in court that things are not clear. A private company, which we have now established could have access or permission with regard to outsourcing services, could use that in a way that is, if not clandestine, then not intended. That could be done because matters are not clearly stipulated in the Bill.

Andy Burnham: I take the hon. Gentleman’s point on board. However, the reference in paragraph (e) to
“the efficient and effective provision of public services”
is clear. I expect that we will discuss the term “public authority” in relation to an upcoming clause. Because that term is defined, it is clear who these measures will relate to. Therefore, an assurance can be given that the range of organisations that can access information under this measure is limited.
Let me explain to all Opposition Members what makes this clause important. We have said all along that the provision of better public services is a crucial part of the reason for introducing this legislation. Departments and public bodies seek to identify people every day; that is part of their core business. That is true of the health service, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department for Transport in respect of driving licences, the Home Office and the police in respect of immigration, firearms licences and crime. It is true of all Departments.
Our systems of public administration have developed in such a way that each body runs its own system of identity verification. They have their own databases and procedures to establish that people are who they say they are. It is important to emphasise that the Bill changes that in a way that is right and that will lead to the better administration of our public services. If we create a database that links biometric information to personal details, we will create a much higher standard of identity verification than we have had under the old system of a passport photograph or a signature. It is right that other Departments can use that database once it is created, so that they can go to one place to ensure that people are who they say they are. That is a sensible way in which to use the database, and it will bring benefits across the public sector.

Ben Wallace: What safeguards can the Under-Secretary give? Clause 19(5)(b) refers to
“a prescribed Northern Ireland department”.
Can he explain what that term means? The bodies mentioned earlier in the clause are law enforcement agencies, and the employees are subject to a degree of vetting. What about some of the Northern Ireland agencies? Recently, with regard to Sinn Fein, individuals have been expelled from Stormont for looking through certain people’s records in a “Northern Ireland department”. I ask for an assurance about that both for me and, perhaps, for others who take an interest in Northern Ireland matters.

Andy Burnham: The hon. Gentleman raises a legitimate point. I emphasise again that we owe it to all the various public bodies that run public services and that are responsible for the security of the people of our country to make their job as easy as possible. We should enable them to use whatever technology is available so that their processes can be made more secure. However, he makes a fair point. The scope of the Bill is restricted. He will see that the subsection mentions a “prescribed Northern Ireland department”. Obviously, the prescribed Department would be laid out in regulations flowing from the Bill. That is the right way to implement the measure. Those Departments administer social security and are responsible for driving licences. Those are the same functions to which I referred when responding to the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood). We want the functions that public bodies in England, Wales and Scotland benefit from to be extended to Northern Ireland.
There is no difference in the argument. It is simply about allowing the public sector per se to benefit from and have access to the highest standard of identity verification that we can provide. Doing that will avoid the replication involved in each Department running its own system. It will also give them confidence that they are verifying somebody against the register and need not fear that fraud is being carried out.
With those reassurances, I hope that I can persuade the hon. and learned Member for Harborough to withdraw the amendment.
There are further safeguards: the public interest test in clause 1(4) and the oversight of the commissioner. The subsection is an important one that goes to the heart of the Bill. It goes to the heart of one of the main reasons that we believe that the national identity register is in the interests of the country and of the good running of our public services. I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Ben Wallace: I did not intend to speak, but I want to press the Government on the point that I raised with the Under-Secretary. If we are widening the group of people who will have access to the register or the functions of the Department, it is important that the Government show that they have given some thought to the individual operators that may use that system. There is vetting at different levels in the law  enforcement agencies, the security services and areas such as the fraud prevention part of the Treasury. There is an element of trust in that.
The fact that only by questioning the Minister was it raised that, at some time, a regulation will expand on the prescribed measures does not give me confidence that the Government have given much thought to the other half. It is not dramatic enough to talk of rogue elements, but if we are starting to allow more people to sit at a computer and to look at a register, there must be an agreement from the Government that there will be an element of vetting. That will protect us as individuals and ensure that a person will not be dragged off the street, or moved from one Department to another and then get access to information.
I used the example of Northern Ireland because I am on a number of Sinn Fein websites and have been a prescribed target of some of those organisations. There is a considerable case history of leaks from Departments, not intentionally, but by individuals working in bodies as innocent as the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, or the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, passing on details about individuals.

Andy Burnham: I take the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but it seems that opposition has done funny things to the Conservative party. It now appears not to trust the organisations that it would have trusted to uphold their statutory functions. Does he not accept that those organisations will hold data? They do hold data. It is part of their job. They must hold data. It is in everyone’s interests that those data are correct. That is simply what the debate is about.

Ben Wallace: First, perhaps the Under-Secretary does not recognise that there are different classifications in Northern Ireland that prohibit certain officials from seeing certain documentation. I ask him to recognise that point. Secondly, the difference is that, under previous Governments and—currently—under this Government, the leak was limited to the Department that the individual worked in. They could get access only to a DVLA record or to a council tax record. Those records were not brought together under one umbrella, called a central database, which gives much more up-to-date and wider basic information. The point is that there will be a central point of access that goes beyond departmental limits. It is on that point that I ask the Under-Secretary for protection, especially as he is so keen to allow a Department to have wider access.
I am not asking the Under-Secretary not to do what he plans to do; I am asking him to come forward with more details on how exactly the Government are ensuring that operators of the system are trusted individuals, or that those operators have some control so that the individual is protected. That is all I ask, but it seems that the Under-Secretary does not want to listen even to that. The reality is that there have been such problems historically. We are now putting everything in one basket, and more people are to be  allowed access. I ask him to keep that concern at the back of his mind when he produces an “Oh well, it will appear later in regulations.” This is yet another example of the Christmas tree. We are talking about individuals’ safety, and it is important that he gives due weight to the issue.

Edward Garnier: I agree with my hon. Friend, and I would ask the Under-Secretary to keep that concern not at the back of his mind, but at the front of it, during the whole of our deliberations and during the later drafting of the statutory instruments containing the regulatory powers.
This is another debate about access and function creep. The Under-Secretary said that the phrase “public services” in clause 1(4)(e) is designed to help me understand the arguments, but “public services” is an undefined item in that paragraph. Why do we need a Minister to explain it under clause 19? We should have had those details before the Bill was debated, and in the draft Bill. We are creating not just a database, but a leviathan that will demand ever more from the citizen for the benefit of the administration of the state. I am not convinced that those demands are counter-balanced or adequately defined by the benefit to the citizen of giving up information to the register.
I will not press for a Division on the amendment, but I want to register yet again my dissatisfaction with the way in which the Government respond to our amendments. The Bill has been inadequately prepared and thought through, and despite the fact that we went around the houses with this Bill in the last Parliament, the Government seem to have learned precisely nothing from the experience and from the views of others since then. We will certainly get back to this issue on another occasion, but at this stage I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Jimmy Hood: Before we proceed to the next amendment, may I remind hon. Members not to whisper with colleagues sitting next to them? I am beginning to hear whispers, conversation and comment from the Chair. As hon. Members will know, that is out of order.

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 71, in clause 19, page 18, line 5, leave out subsection (6).
This will be yet another short debate about the clause. The amendment would delete subsection (6). This is perhaps an even more stark example of the reason for my making the complaint that I made in the previous debate. Under subsection (6), we are talking not about Departments, but about designated documents authorities. Although the expression “designated documents authorities” is defined in the general interpretation clause towards the end of the Bill, those of us here today have absolutely no idea—indeed, neither does anyone else—what a designated documents authority would actually be. None the less, we see that the provision of information to one of these unspecified authorities is authorised by the clause
“where the information is provided for purposes connected with the exercise or performance by the authority of ... any of its powers or duties by virtue of this Act”,
or, amusingly, under subsection (6)(b),
“any of its other powers or duties in relation to the issue or”—
and here is my favourite word—
“modification of designated documents.”
I shall not repeat myself, but this is an increasingly bad measure, and nothing that the Government have said so far persuades me that my complaints are anything other than entirely justified. I look forward to hearing the Under-Secretary have another go at explaining why these unspecified powers are justified.

Andy Burnham: I shall respond directly to the amendment. I hope that we can deal with it briefly because it relates to the debate that we have just had.
If the hon. and learned Gentleman wants me to have another go, I shall say it again: if he does not think this is good enough, I am not sure what else I can do. Surely all of us want agencies carrying out public functions to identify people to the highest standard possible. Carrying out that identification in one place through one process is likely to lead to higher standards of identity verification and to the issuing of fewer fraudulent documents. That has to be in the public interest, and it is one of the reasons for introducing the Bill.
The Government have made it clear that when ID cards begin to be issued in 2008, they will be issued by a new executive agency incorporating the functions of the UK Passport Service and working closely in conjunction with the immigration and nationality directorate of the Home Office in respect of foreign nationals. We believe that there are good reasons for including these provisions in the Bill. It is possible that we may wish in future to designate a different category of document that is not issued by the new agency. This could include, for example, a driving licence that is issued by the DVLA or by Driver and Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland, both of which are separate agencies and are not the responsibility of the Home Secretary.
As things stand, the Government have only stated their intention to designate the passport, but it would make sense to consider driving licences in that context. The power under subsection (6) would enable us to do that. It would ensure that the agency was able to access the same information provided to it as would be available to the agency issuing ID cards initially. It would also mean that the same information could be provided to any other designated documents authority so that all ID cards would be issued in a uniform manner. As has been mentioned before, that could include bodies such as the Criminal Records Bureau, with which we all share an interest in performing identity checks to the very highest standard.
Although I understand the reasons behind the hon. and learned Gentleman’s amendment, I hope that he will accept the position that I have outlined. He will know that the linkage of ID cards to designated documents is an important part of the rationale advanced in the Bill. It will enable all of us to have more confidence in those documents once the scheme  is fully up and running. It is a sensible measure that will allow organisations to share all the information involved in an application to register with the national identity register.
I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that the designation of documents is an important process underpinning the Bill, and for that reason, I ask him to seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Garnier: I would have a lot more confidence in what the Under-Secretary said if I thought that he understood the profound nature of our concerns. He uses expressions such as “this could include”. In my view, that shows a terrifying lack of certainty, and I do not think that the Government have quite addressed our concerns. He has certainly not addressed—perhaps he could not do so—the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace) about the protection of personal information from access by unauthorised people even within Government, let alone from outside elements.
I continue to register my deep-felt concern that the Bill is leading us down a path that we will regret unless the Government tighten up their understanding, and therefore ours, of what they intend. In the meantime, although I promise to return to this point on another occasion, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Edward Garnier: In the light of my objections, which were unanswered, I rise simply to invite the Committee to divide on whether clause 19 stand part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided:  Ayes 9, Noes 5.

NOES

Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Further uses connected with the prevention and detection of crime

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 72, in clause 20, page 18, line 45, leave out subsection (3).
The amendment seeks to delete subsection (3). The clause title reflects, no doubt, a worthy and uncontroversial desire—preventing and detecting crime—but we are entitled to greater scrutiny of the clause than a simple nod-through would provide.
Subsection (1) refers to “section 23”, and states:
“The Secretary of State may, without the individual’s consent, provide a person with information recorded in an individual’s entry in the Register if—
(a)the provision of the information is authorised by this section; and
(b)there is compliance with any requirements imposed by or under section 23 in relation to the provision of the information.”
I will not read clause 23 out, but I defy anybody who reads it to have a better idea of what the Government intend at the end of the read-though than they had at the start.
Clause 20 goes on to deal with the provision of information that does not fall within the audit trail under paragraph 9 of schedule 1. It then states:
“Section 18 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, (restriction on disclosure of information for overseas purposes) shall have effect”.
I want to hear what the Government are doing in that regard.
May I underline again my general concerns about the nature of the Bill as it is increasingly revealed? Subsection (4) makes it clear that the provision of information falling within the audit trail of paragraph 9 of schedule 1
“is authorised by this section if it is provided—
(a)to a person to whom information may be provided by virtue of any of subsections (3) to (5) of section 19 or is made as mentioned in subsection (2) of this section”.
Subsection (4)(b), which is the little catch-all, states:
“for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime.”
These are not tedious debating society points. We are affecting the relationship between the state and the individual. I urge the Government to apply their mind with greater vigour to the access and function creep that the subsection deals with and which my amendment invites them to address.

Andy Burnham: I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that I consider none of his amendments, or the comments he supplements them with, debating points. In this case, he is dealing with a serious point, but his concern would more properly be directed to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Clause 20 simply aligns the Bill with measures in that Act on the provision of information without consent.
Section 17 was included in the Act to ensure that, for the purposes of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings, public authorities can disclose information that is subject to statutory restriction on  disclosure. Under section 17(2), information that is subject to a statutory bar may be disclosed for the purposes of carrying out, initiating, bringing to an end or facilitating a determination of criminal investigations and criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
Clause 20 will ensure that information from the register can be provided without consent
“for any of the purposes specified in section 17(2)(a) to (d) of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001”,
provided that there is compliance with the rules set out in clause 23, which we will come to later.
Those rules lay down a clear framework in which information can be given. This takes us back to other points. For instance, the rules lay down the rank at which an official in an organisation can be supplied with information and the use to which information can be put. I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that the assurance he wants, although it may be buried, certainly is in clause 23, which provides some safeguards that he seeks.
Subsection (3), which would be deleted by the hon. and learned Gentleman’s amendment, is one of the safeguards, so I am surprised in some ways that he has directed his attention to it. It will allow the Secretary of State to give a direction prohibiting the provision of information for use in specified overseas proceedings. Again, that mirrors the corresponding power in section 18 of the 2001 Act. The amendment would remove that power.
Under section 18, the Secretary of State might prohibit information from being provided for overseas purposes if he considers it more appropriate for any jurisdictional matter or investigation to be exercised or carried out by a court of the UK or a third country. If the Bill allows for the provision of information in the circumstances set out, it follows that the gloss put on section 17 by section 18 of the 2001 Act should be reflected in the Bill.
The clause will simply extend to the national identity register the powers that already exist in respect of other data sources in the UK. It is right that the Secretary of State should be able to specify overseas proceedings for which he considers the disclosure of information under clause 20 not—I stress “not”—appropriate. That safeguard and restriction reserves to the Home Secretary the right not to comply fully when a request for information is made.
I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman accepts that the clause deals with quite a narrow point and that it brings the Bill fully in line with legislation already passed by the House. There are safeguards in place, and I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Garnier: The Under-Secretary said that a framework is set out in clause 23, and that it is clear. I accept that, in his eyes, the vagueness of clause 23 provides a framework. It certainly is not clear, but we will discuss that in due course. I am not in the least  satisfied with how this part of the Bill is constructed and we may return to the matter, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Alistair Carmichael: Subsection (4)(b) deals with the authorisation of provision of information if it is provided
“for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime.”
I am curious to know why the word “serious” is included when it is not included in any other definition in the Bill.

Andy Burnham: I shall consider that point. The clause deals with the relationship between the Bill and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which, by definition, deals with serious crime. I think that is the reason for the drafting, but if it is not I will write to the hon. Gentleman. The clause relates to a measure that deals specifically with serious crime, which is why the provision is drafted in that way. However, I assure him that I will come back to him on the point.
The audit trail of paragraph 9 information may be sensitive and we have ensured throughout the Bill that there is a higher test for access to such information. Only when serious crime is involved will police forces be able to access that information, which is probably why the provision is drafted in that way. If I need to clarify any of that in writing, I shall do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Use for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in clause 21, page 19, line 23, at end insert—
‘(2A)Where subsection (2) applies, the Secretary of State shall notify the individual in writing that he has taken action under that subsection within 30 days of doing so.’.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 183, in clause 23, page 20, line 26, at end insert
‘and,
(c)notifying the individual of the fact that information has been provided.’.

Edward Garnier: Amendment No. 183 would have a similar effect on clause 23, which we touched on briefly a moment ago, to that which amendment No. 73 would have on this clause. I want to ensure that there is no unnecessary, uncalled for or unjustified growth in secret government.
The clause is entitled “Use for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information” and it will allow the Secretary of State to tell someone who is not the subject of the information that something recorded  about an individual is inaccurate or incomplete, and allow him to tell that unspecified third party that the information on the register is inaccurate or incomplete without letting the subject of the information know either that the information is inaccurate or incomplete or that he has told someone it is inaccurate or incomplete.
Unless the Government can persuade us otherwise, the Secretary of State should notify the subject of the information in writing that he has taken action under the provision within 30 days of doing so. There is no magic about the figure of 30 days, and if the Government want to specify another period I shall be happy to go along with it if it is reasonable.
I have a philosophical objection to things going on about me out of my sight unless there is a good and justifiable public policy reason for them to do so. I understand that there will be occasions when the register might say, for example, that I am a suspected drug dealer, people trafficker or money launderer. The third party—let us assume that it is the police, and perhaps the chief constable of a particular area—may wish to gain access to the information about me on the register, on which those data have been recorded.
I appreciate that, on other occasions, one of the Ministers has said that opinion evidence or opinion shall not be recorded in the register. However, I drew their attention to the definition of personal information in the Data Protection Act 1998, under which opinion evidence or opinion seem to be recordable.
I appreciate also that there shall be occasions when it might be in the interest of the detection or the prevention of crime for that third party, if it is a police authority or officer, to know that the information designating me as a suspected people trafficker or a money or drug criminal is inaccurate. It might be in my interests for that to be corrected. I also have a right to know the information about me on the register that is wrong.
This short debate has briefly exposed the dangers inherent in the ID register system as well as the use that can be made of it by the state either for or against my interests and, more particularly, without my knowledge. The more we computerise and dehumanise government, the more important it is for the individual citizen to be treated as a human being rather than as a digit and as a collection of inanimate information.
The Bill is all about giving the Secretary of State undefined powers to do undefined things, nominally in the interests of the state and in the interests of ourselves as a collective of individuals. However, we are becoming pieces of information to be processed, rather than human beings. If we are to move down this road for reasons of administrative and governmental efficiency, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that the Government exist to benefit the individual and to benefit society, which is a collection of human beings, not just numbers.
I urge the Government when addressing amendment No. 73 and amendment No. 183, which relates to clause 23, to explain how they can justify the  movement of information about me, whether accurate or inaccurate, in circumstances in which I am wholly ignorant of that traffic.

Alistair Carmichael: I have added my name to amendment No. 73. Amendment No. 183, which stands in my name, relates to clause 23, but it deals with much the same point.
Returning to an earlier debate about the ownership of the information and the basis on which it is provided, I share philosophical difficulties of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and it remains my strong view that the information should remain in the ownership of the individual to whom it relates. That being the case, it makes sense that when the information has been wrongly recorded or corrected, as outlined in the clause, the person to whom the information relates should be made aware of that fact. The one obvious rider relates to national security and the prevention and the detection of crime. With that, I shall be interested to hear what the Under-Secretary has to say.

Andy Burnham: Amendment No. 73 would make it a requirement to notify an individual in writing within 30 days if information had been requested about him under clause 21 by another person. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland would expand the power under clause 23 to make regulations, so that they could include provision about notifying an individual that information had been provided without his consent under clauses 19 to 22.
I want to make the important point that we have constantly gone over such ground during our proceedings and we are now having to do so yet again. However, it is crucial that that happens because, although we have discussed these matters, the same myths are being propagated about what the Bill will and will not do.
For the avoidance of doubt, I say to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that, if he were a suspected criminal or drug dealer, such information could not be held on the register because it would not be a registrable fact. He need have no fear that such a position is possible. As he knows, the registrable facts are set out clearly under schedule 1. It is for the organisation requesting the information to examine its own records. Obviously, other organisations could hold information that he might be a suspected drug dealer, but not the national identity register. It is an identity verification system and it will not hold all types of information about criminal or medical records.
We have been over such matters before and we must do so again because we cannot allow such arguments to stand unchallenged. It is important to take such action because it affects the whole basis on which the amendments were introduced. There is no fear that such information can be held, so a lot of the arguments fall because of that statement.
It is important to note in respect of both amendments that, to comply with the first data protection principle, which requires that the information be processed fairly, the Secretary of State will have to give notification to data subjects of, among other things, the purposes for which data will be processed. In practice, in respect of the national identity register, it will probably be the case that on the application form an explanation will be given of the power to carry out cross-checks under clause 21 and the power to provide information without consent under clauses 19, 20 and 22. In all likelihood, such matters will be explained on the application form for people registering with the scheme.
However, unlike the two amendments, the Data Protection Act does not oblige the Secretary of State to give notification of each occasion on which the powers are used. There are good reasons why we consider it not appropriate to place the Secretary of State under such an obligation. As for amendment No. 183, it is obvious that there will be many circumstances in which it would be completely inappropriate to inform a data subject that information about him had been provided. Such notifications could, for example, undermine criminal investigations, matters of national security and Customs-related investigations.
The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will know that one reason for introducing the Bill is to weed out and close down people’s ability to acquire documents fraudulently in false names. If people were notified of discrepancies, they would also be notified of the fact that an investigation was under way into why they had applied for documents in two different names. There might be good reasons for not having a requirement in the Bill whereby each time a cross-check is undertaken, the individual is notified.
On amendment No. 73, clause 21 was drafted specifically to allow the Secretary of State to notify people or organisations that provide information as part of the identify checking process if subsequent inaccuracies or omissions are discovered in the information they supplied. That will enable us, when an organisation has provided information that we believe is inaccurate or incomplete, to alert that organisation to that fact.
As a result of that power, the administrators of the national identity register will be able to help to ensure that data held in other places by Departments and public bodies are accurate. In turn, that will help us in a general fight against identity fraud. It will ensure that those who try to avoid identification by using slightly different details will find it harder to do so.
Members of the Committee may have heard about the publication yesterday of a UK Passport Service report on its personal identity project. It covers the processes whereby the UK Passport Service is increasingly cross-referencing data received with those held by other Departments. That has proved to be successful and, as hon. Members can see from the report, the project is to be extended. The measure simply gives the same powers in relation to the national identity register as exist with regard to the UK Passport Service.
In most cases, when processing an application form, the Secretary of State is likely to have the most recent and accurate information about an individual. Where a discrepancy arises between that information and the information held on another database, that other database may well be out of date. It will then be a matter for the organisation holding those data to consider amending its records or make further inquiries of the individual. At that point, there is a strong likelihood that the organisation concerned will contact the individual to alert him or her that a discrepancy has arisen and to ask for clarification. In most cases, people will experience the effect that the amendment seeks to achieve: there will be notification when such a check has been carried out.
It is possible that the Secretary of State may have reason to believe that the information on the application form is inaccurate and that the data held by other organisations are correct. In those circumstances, as the UK Passport Service is already doing, it is right that the Secretary of State has the power to try to clear up the discrepancy. It is open to the Secretary of State to contact the individual should he wish to do so.
A legal obligation to notify the data subject every time a cross-check is carried out, even where no discrepancy is revealed—that is an important point—would involve a disproportionate investment of time and resources. It would be bureaucratic and unnecessary. As I have outlined, in practice, where discrepancies arise, the data subject is likely to be contacted by one or other data controller. Furthermore, the power is limited to the validation of information that is or could be held on the register. There is no scope for it to be used in a way that would be surprising or that would involve anything other than the usual identity information.
I give that cast-iron assurance to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and, for those reasons, ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Garnier: Let me put the Under-Secretary out of his misery: I will ask the Committee’s leave to withdraw the amendment, but I want him and the Government to understand that in a democracy public trust in the institutions of government is vital. I am afraid that public trust in the Government—I do not mean this Government; I mean Governments generally—is declining as we become more and more a computerised society and less and less a society in which people interact with each other as individuals.
I am sure that we have all received any number of complaints about the operations of the Child Support Agency. That is a classic example of a situation in which the individual feels wholly disempowered as a consequence of having to deal, as a number, with a computer, which simply will not sympathise with his personal problems.
I know precisely what schedule 1 of the Bill says, but I am not so naive as to believe that a massive exchange of information is not already taking place between Departments, even before the Bill becomes an Act. Nor am I so naive as to think that, just because we have the Bill as drafted, all sorts of things will not go on that  are not specified in the Bill and still less in the regulations. I flag up yet again a concern that needs to be addressed, if not by this Committee then by some other part of Parliament at a later stage. In the meanwhile, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 32, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 33, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.
No. 76, in clause 21, page 19, line 36, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

Patrick Mercer: These three amendments are simple. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (4) include rather imprecise references to
“something recorded in that individual’s entry”,
“something provided to the Secretary of State”,
and
“something otherwise available to the Secretary of State”.
The amendments would simply replace the three references to “something” with “a specified statement”. I hope that will tie down subsection (4) and make it a little clearer.
No doubt the Under-Secretary will tell us that this clause should be read in conjunction with clause 11 and that he will resist the change to the wording, because changing the wording here would mean that the wording in clause 11 ought to be changed. However, I would still appreciate his explanation.

Andy Burnham: The hon. Gentleman anticipates my notes on clause 21 and this amendment. The clause must be seen in the light of clause 11, which contains the power to require information for validating the register in the first place. Clause 21 comes into play when it appears that that information is incorrect and it needs to be cross-checked or verified with another Department. He is right that the clause is complementary to and consistent with clause 11—perhaps that should have been clause 12, but that is a different argument.
Clauses 11 and 21 use the word “something” to refer to the information that can be required for the purposes of verification. As we have discussed, “something” covers any information that can be recorded in the register. Beyond that, the Bill does not limit the information to which clauses 11 and 21 can relate. However, the persons from whom information might be required under clause 11—and thus provided to, under clause 21—must be specified in an order, which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
While the hon. Gentleman was speaking, I was reminded of the phrase “something of the night” and the fact that, although it is vague and imprecise, we all knew what she meant by it. In this legislation, “something” refers to things such as a photograph and fingerprints. The term is deliberately wide, because we  are talking about not only facts, data and words, but other information that could be held on the register, such as a biometric reading or a photograph. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman again that it does not extend to anything other than the information held on the register. Schedule 1 guarantees that. The term “something” refers to paragraph 2 of schedule 1, which lists
“(a)a photograph of his head and shoulders;
(b)his signature;
(c)his fingerprints;
(d)other biometric information about him.”
The term is used so that all the registrable facts can be encompassed.
I have explained why the amendment is neither sensible nor necessary, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for that explanation. I should apologise for my earlier absence; I trust the reason was explained and the apology accepted.

Edward Garnier: I did not explain.

Patrick Mercer: Forgive me, Mr. Hood. I attended the evacuation exercise in the Chamber. I hope you will indulge me for having done so.
The phrase “déjà vu” has come to mind many times in respect of the Bill. I remember putting precisely the same arguments as those I have put with regard to this amendment to a different Minister in a previous debate, and I received almost the same arguments in response. I take on board the points that have been made about clause 11 and paragraph 2 of schedule 1, although I still have reservations and remain less than content. However, as the Under-Secretary gave a lucid explanation, as did his ministerial colleague, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Power to authorise other uses of information

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 77, in clause 22, page 20, line 3, at end insert—
‘(da)any disclosure of information which results or would result in interference with an individual’s private and family life is proportionate, and is for the purpose of—
(i)the protection of public safety or public health, or
(ii)the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;’.
The amendment would add to clause 22 a reference to the requirements of the European convention, by implication if not expressly. No doubt the Government will say that such a reference is implied anyhow. The amendment also refers, again by implication, to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act 2000.
I will set the amendment in context. We are dealing with the passing of information to a public authority without the consent of the individual. “Public authority” is, for the purposes of the Bill, defined by clause 43, on general interpretation, as having
“the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998”.
I was going to take the Committee directly to the Human Rights Act 1998, but, as we discussed a couple of weeks ago, a public authority comes to be defined not so much by its name as by what it does. For example, while the BBC is not, for some purposes, a public authority, for other purposes it is.
One can think of any number of examples in which, when making a private contract, a body is not a public authority, but, when it is doing something that affects the individual citizen, it is a public authority. We need to be careful about accepting at face value the definition in the general interpretation clause about what a public authority is.
I also have a complaint that, as before, the Government are requiring Parliament to give them unspecified and vague powers. To see that, one has to look only at clause 22(1)(b), which says that
“the information is of a description specified or described in an order made by the Secretary of State”.
We have not seen those orders. I do not suppose that we will get see them in time for consideration on Report. I doubt that we will see a definition on Third Reading. I doubt that even the other place will receive a definition that would satisfy a reasonable reader when they discuss the Bill later in the year or early next year.
Although “public authority” is defined by section 6 of the Human Rights Act, the definition is not specified or described here, nor is the information referred to in subsection (1)(d). Therefore, it seems to us important that the Government should explain themselves so that, to refer to amendment No. 77,
“any disclosure of information which results or would result in interference with an individual’s private and family life is proportionate”.
That is the individual’s article 8 right under the European convention.
That disclosure of information must be
“for the purpose of the protection of public safety or public health”.
That is my Civil Contingencies Act point. The definitions of public safety and public health in the Civil Contingencies Act are remarkably wide.
Disclosure of information could also be for
“the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Again, under a number of Acts of Parliament passed in the last half dozen years, all sorts of powers are given to all sorts of people, no doubt for good public policy reasons. However, when mixed into the bowl of the Identity Cards Bill, concerns of private rights against the state come to mind.
I want to be assured by the Government, not just by implication and not just because the Secretary of State has rubber-stamped the front of the Bill with his belief that it complies with the Human Rights Act 1998. I have seen that happen many times and I have seen it challenged. I have seen individual aspects of Bills, or of  clauses of Bills, fall foul of the Human Rights Act. I want to be assured that the Government have in mind the rights of the individual and the interference that could be done to the rights of the individual, particularly in relation to his family life and his private life. That is described in our amendment.

Andy Burnham: I hope that I can deal quickly with the amendments. The hon. and learned Gentleman complained earlier that the Government were not listening to some of the concerns. He will know that when the Bill was last debated in Committee there was a fairly detailed discussion on the clause and the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Mr. Browne), gave a commitment to consider the concerns and to give further thought to the clause. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be reassured that the clause has been improved in that respect and that the Government have responded to some of the concerns put to the then Minister by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins).
The clause is more narrowly drawn than it was. I shall mention some of the ways in which it has been improved. As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, although we expect most of the checks on the register to be done with the consent of the individual, there are circumstances where we will allow them to be done without consent—and we have been discussing those today. However, once the scheme is in operation, it is right to keep open the possibility that there may be other situations in which it becomes necessary, in the public interest, to provide information to other public bodies. It would be wrong to list those bodies in the Bill now and wrong to require further primary legislation as the logical extension of the measure, which is why the clause is drafted as it is.
It might help Committee members if I give a few examples of how we envisage the power being used. For instance, it might be sensible to allow local government to have access to the information. The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that local government administers the payment of housing benefit. In fraud investigations it would be sensible, from its point of view, for it to have access to the register. The fire and ambulance services could also be beneficiaries of access when verifying identity against the register following a major accident.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Betts) raised the possibility that the register may, at some point, be used for electoral registration. In future, particularly in respect of measures to combat electoral fraud, the national identity register could provide a sensible way to maintain the integrity of the electoral register and tackle, nay eliminate, electoral fraud.
There are circumstances in which it is sensible, for good public administration, for us to extend the bodies who could benefit through secondary legislation, with the key proviso that Parliament decides that it is necessary to do so.
The power in the clause is subject to the affirmative order-making procedure. An organisation could not be added without parliamentary approval. That was  added after the previous discussion—it was to be done under the negative procedure before. The Government have listened to the concerns that were expressed previously and have strengthened the Bill in that way. The authorisation procedure provided for in clause 23 would be subject to applicable oversight arrangements under the national identity commissioner.
The power was significantly narrowed during the parliamentary progress of the Bill in the previous Session and further safeguards have been added. The information in paragraph 9 of schedule 1 is now excluded. Information can be provided only to bodies that are public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998. That is spelled out in the definitions contained in the back of the Bill. A further significant safeguard has been added to this version of the Bill: subsection (2) now provides that the order-making power can be used only when the provision of information is necessary in the public interest, as defined in clause 1(4).
Amendment No. 77 would insert a requirement for any provision under clause 22 to be proportionate in its interference with an individual’s private and family life and to be
“for the purpose of ... the protection of public safety or public health, or ... the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Nobody in the Committee would have any objection to those reasons, and I understand the hon. and learned Gentleman’s concern. However, I reassure him that the amendment is unnecessary because of subsection (2) and the full application of the Human Rights Act to the Bill. Under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, a public authority must not interfere with a person’s right to a private or family life except in limited circumstances. Those include when such interference is
“in accordance with the law ... in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
That is a detailed list. However, we are confident and can give the hon. and learned Gentleman the assurance that the Bill fully complies with the Human Rights Act. His amendment, which lists the circumstances in which information may be provided, is more limited than the provisions of the ECHR. We believe that agreeing to it could mean that the scheme was not able to maximise its benefits.
The amendment would exclude the ability to provide information without consent to any additional organisations when that was in the interests of national security, economic well-being or the prevention or detection of crime. That would mean that we might not be able to provide information to local authorities for fraud-prevention purposes, for example.
I hope that Opposition Members will accept that we listened to the concerns that were expressed by their Front-Bench team in the previous Session. The safeguards provided under the subsection have been significantly strengthened and the subsection’s scope has been significantly narrowed. I do not think that Opposition Members need fear anything from the bodies that we have in mind. As I say, local  government is an obvious example of such a body, but the information might also be useful to the fire or emergency services.
The possibility of using the register in respect of electoral registration should be considered by Members on both sides of the Committee, given the number of people who currently fall off the electoral register. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe made that important point.
For all those reasons and because of the final safeguard of the House deciding whether the power would ever be invoked, Opposition Members can feel reassured that they have been listened to and that the clause includes the necessary safeguards, given the Human Rights Act and the access to information provisions. I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Garnier: My hon. Friend the Member for Newark will explain in a minute how satisfactory we think the parliamentary oversight in this clause. However, I am getting more and more worried as the Bill progresses. The Under-Secretary says that it “might” be sensible to let local government or the fire and ambulance services have access to the information. It might be, but we ought to be told whether that is or is not Government policy and whether it is or is not intended that the Bill should cover that.

Andy Burnham: Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman should have listened to what I said. He will be told, because the House will decide whether a body will be included. It is not for me to dictate which bodies could be included; I simply gave him some examples of how the provisions in the Bill might logically be extended to provide for good public administration. However, ultimately, the House would decide whether that power was ever invoked.

Edward Garnier: I want the Under-Secretary to understand me. I am not making a remark or advancing an argument that is personal to him. I am concerned, on behalf of the Opposition and the citizens whom I represent, about the growing activities of the state. He is wearing the uniform, metaphorically speaking, of a Minister. As far as I am concerned, he represents the state and it is up to the Government, who, under our system, present drafted legislation to Parliament for approval, to explain to the Committee what they have in mind. If they do not have anything in mind, that does not prevent me from complaining that we are passing legislation in a vacuum.
I know that the Government say that there will be a statutory instrument before Parliament in due course —we shall discuss later whether it can be properly overseen—but that may not happen for 18 months or two years. In the meantime, as a Member of Parliament, I am required to give the Government the power to do things that they have not necessarily thought about. If they have thought about those things, they are not prepared to tell us in sufficient detail how their thinking has developed.
The Government must understand that problem if they are to understand the genuine concerns of the public about how Parliament is required to give the Government power. That power must be accountable to the public through Parliament and, if the Government have no idea of what they intend in the clauses, we are all the poorer. I appreciate the arithmetic of the parliamentary situation but that does not prevent me, and should not inhibit me, from making such complaints. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 78, in clause 22, page 20, line 15, at end add—
‘(4)No draft order containing a provision that the Secretary of State is authorised to make by this section is to be laid before Parliament unless—
(a)the Secretary of State has prepared and published a report containing a proposal for the making of such provision;
(b)the report sets out the Secretary of State’s reasons for making the proposal;
(c)the report has been laid before Parliament and each House has approved the proposal contained in the report, either with or without modifications; and
(d)the draft order gives effect to the proposal so far as approved by both Houses.’.
This amendment continues the movement that we started by tabling amendment No. 77, to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough has already referred. Amendment No. 78 refers once again to the whole business of parliamentary approval for what the Government suggest in the Bill. The amendment would simply add a new subsection (4).
I followed closely what the Under-Secretary said about the previous amendment. I was interested to hear that we won some small gains during the last debate on the Bill and I trust he is prepared to give further ground on this amendment for the simple reason that we know the power to disclose without consent is theoretically extended without limit under the clause.
Regardless of the fact that approval is required for regulation, many of us remain extremely worried by the fact that the Home Secretary has essentially written himself a blank cheque. It is difficult to imagine a situation under the clause in which disclosure of information on the register might be justified. On top of that clauses 19 and 21 are already extremely broad. I would have thought that the scope offered by those two clauses was enough.
The amendment is very simple. It is designed merely to ensure that parliamentary approval occurs in order that the power to authorise other uses of information under the clause is scrutinised by both Houses. I could go on, but time forbids. I hope that my point is clear and that the Under-Secretary agrees to the amendment. I am interested to know his views.

Alistair Carmichael: Briefly, I added my name to the amendment for the reasons already outlined by the hon. Gentleman. It seems that we have had vagueness heaped on vagueness, and broadness broadened by broadness.
The amendment would put an important check on the manner in which the powers could be extended, but there is a slight irony in the fact that the hon. Gentleman would provide it by way of the so-called super-affirmative procedure. The Committee is aware that I have severe reservations about its efficacy. Ironically, it might even be argued that, by borrowing one of the mechanisms devised by the Government, the official Opposition have managed to produce what would be regarded by some—though clearly not by you, Mr. Hood—as a wrecking amendment.
It is important to have a measure of proper parliamentary scrutiny of the inclusion of further bodies under the provisions, which already include a very broad range of powers. I shall be interested to hear from the Under-Secretary, not least to learn whether he can give any reason why the super-affirmative procedure cannot be made to work in this instance.

Andy Burnham: Opposition Members have said that the amendment would ensure that bodies were designated under the powers through the super-affirmative procedure, rather than the affirmative. We have come some distance towards the hon. Member for Newark, but I am going to disappoint him, I am afraid, as we shall resist going the extra mile and using the super-affirmative procedure, partly because we feel it would represent inappropriate parliamentary scrutiny of what is proposed.
The super-affirmative procedure would be right for powers to do with compulsion, because that would directly affect every citizen of the country. It would, obviously, be a major change. We believe it would be right to use a procedure involving that level of scrutiny in such a case, notwithstanding our exchanges on whether that procedure, as currently conceived, is a workable and effective solution. We endeavour to get back to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland on that point.
Before going into detail, I should say to the hon. Member for Newark that we did not just elevate the check in the clause from the negative to the affirmative procedure. As he knows, subsection (2) was also added, which directly links any order made under this part of the Bill to the public interest test. We also narrowed the provisions by taking out the measures giving access to the information relevant to paragraph 9 of schedule 1. He will see that that is listed under subsection (1)(a). So, in many ways, we have limited the scope of the clause in respect of comments from Opposition Members.
To pick up on the comments made about the previous clause by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, there might be some very sensible reasons for wanting to use the powers—reasons behind which no one need fear anything other than good intent. Local authorities administer public benefits, such as housing benefit and council tax  benefit. Clearly, if a register exists that enables them to carry out those obligations to a higher standard and with a higher level of identity proof, we should logically let them use it. It would not make much sense to take on the expense of creating the register and not give other public bodies that may suffer from identity fraud access to the register. That would be perverse.
Another example might involve the emergency services, be it the fire or the ambulance service. Such a service might seek powers to identify people at the scene of accidents. If it emerged that that was a sensible use of the register and a request was made for that information, all of us, as parliamentarians, would have a duty to listen to people in such a position who were asking us to extend their ability to do their job more effectively. We would have that debate in the House if such a request were made.
I mentioned the purpose relating to electoral registration. We return to the general point that in our view the Bill will aid good public administration right across the piece. Where there is a high standard of identity verification, it makes sense to allow access to organisations that in their statutory functions carry out identity checks and depend on a high standard of identity verification.
I explained to the hon. Member for Newark that the clause is now subject to the affirmative procedure. To go through the same process as is envisaged for the powers to do with compulsion would be to escalate things too far. If anyone were to seek the powers, it would be an obligation too far and could make it more difficult for them to be exercised. I refer him back to the fact that the clause has been significantly strengthened. Bearing my comments in mind, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for his clear exposition, and I note that subsection (2) has been included since we last went round this particular buoy. I maintain that super-affirmative powers would be helpful, but none the less, bearing in mind his comments and not wishing to sound more curmudgeonly than normal, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 - Rules for using information without individual’s consent

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 79, in clause 23, page 20, line 32, leave out from “person” to end of line 34.
If parts of the Bill could be described as a dog’s breakfast, clause 23 is the breakfast, lunch and tea. No canine would be dissatisfied when approaching it. As I mentioned, it is completely incomprehensible, but, worse, it will provide the Secretary of State with huge powers to do things that may be in the national interest—we are uncertain that they would be.
In relation to the Secretary of State, the clause uses phrases such as “may provide a person”, “may by regulations” and “may also by regulations”, and those regulations “may include” certain things. It says that the “rank or position” of the high-ranking police officer
“may be specified in the regulations”.
If clause 23 is desperately vague, subsection (3)(c), which I seek to delete, is even vaguer. Subsection (3) says that the regulations “may include” this, that and the other. Subsection (3)(c) refers to
“provision imposing other requirements as to the manner in which such applications must be made.”
It is simply not good enough to legislate on that basis. I ask the Under-Secretary to explain himself.

Andy Burnham: I feel like I am in the headmaster’s study, having to explain myself. I begin by saying to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the clause will give him some reassurance on the concerns raised in regard to the preceding clauses. Clause 23 lays down the rules. It allows the Secretary of State to lay down the rules for the process by which requests for using information will proceed. That is an important safeguard.
The clause uses the word “may”, but it is clear what is being authorised. Subsection (3)(b) refers to
“provision specifying or describing the persons who are entitled to make applications for the provision of information to a person”.
Okay, that might be vague, but what it means is that the rank and seniority needed for a request to be made, and for information subsequently to be provided, can be specified. That directly addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre about information swirling round organisations. I take his point on that, but the limits to which it can swirl round can be laid down. There can be limits in relation to the rank of the recipient.
Other limits can also be imposed. Paragraph (c) refers to
“provision imposing other requirements as to the manner in which such applications must be made.”
That is the issue at stake in relation to this amendment. This part of the clause allows the Secretary of State to lay out a clear procedure—for instance, that the request must be delivered in writing. That means that there can be a clear audit of the process; it will all be documented. In our view, that will be a safeguard, rather than a weakness that allows any abuse.

Roberta Blackman-Woods: My reading of the clause is different from that of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough. I think it restricts the use of the register; it restricts who can receive information and imposes requirements on the Secretary of State to specify who can make a request for information. Therefore, I am unsure how this concern arises.

Andy Burnham: My hon. Friend is right. This part of the Bill puts in place the rules and safeguards that address the concerns that have been raised. Therefore, Opposition Members should be adding to it, rather than subtracting from it, because each subsection will enable the Secretary of State to be more prescriptive about how requests are made, such as by specifying the person entitled to make applications. Therefore, the clause is important.
The Secretary of State may use a power under the clause to impose regulations stating that applications should be in writing. I am sure hon. Members agree that it might be sensible to insist on that, because it will ensure that there is a documented process and that everything is above board and carried out in a proper manner. The amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s power to insist on such things.
Opposition Members can be assured that a rigorous process will underpin access to information, and the Secretary of State’s powers to lay down regulations are clearly set out. We agree with Opposition Members that the rules should be as clear and rigorous as possible to ensure that there is not abuse of the kind that the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre referred to. It is obviously right that public bodies have the ability to access information in order for them better to do their job, but it is obviously wrong that that information should then leak out or be abused in any way.
These rules will be drafted for the clear purpose that I have outlined; they will give Opposition Members the reassurance they seek. The amendment is unnecessary, and I ask the hon. and learned Member for Harborough to withdraw it.

Edward Garnier: The most significant words the Under-Secretary uttered were that the clause “will enable the Secretary of State to be more prescriptive”. Of course, the Under-Secretary placed the emphasis on the second half—that is, on “to be more prescriptive”—but I am concerned about the first half, which is that the clause “enables the Secretary of State”. Therein lies the philosophical difference between the Government and the Opposition, and between the statists and those who want the citizen to have a role in the direction of his own life. That may be an unbridgeable gap, but it is a gap that needs to be identified and explained to the public at large.
There is no better way to keep something secret than to make a speech about it either on the Floor of the House or in Committee, but let me assure you, Mr. Hood, that Conservative Members will continue to argue for a better balance between the state and the individual, and to argue that the individual should be given the benefit of the doubt, where there is any, as opposed to power and discretion being given to the Secretary of State or the state.
I will not detain the Committee any longer by pressing the amendment to a Division. The time permitted by the Government for discussion of the Bill does not permit us to vote on everything with which we disagree, although that is what we would like to do. There will be other opportunities—I suspect in another place—for this aspect, and many others, of  this wholly unsatisfactory Bill to be debated and scrutinised with greater thoroughness, and I look forward to their lordships’ assistance in that regard later this year. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 - Appointment of National Identity Scheme Commissioner

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 218, in clause 24, page 21, line 14, leave out “The Secretary of State” and insert “Parliament”.
I want to expose the fiction of the Secretary of State and the Executive—the Government—being different from Parliament. It will not take an inordinate length of time to do so. We are keen to give Parliament the power of oversight of the Government. We all know that the Executive sit not just in Parliament, but on it. We are talking about an Executive with a large majority—in historical terms, a majority of 66 over all other parties is large, albeit a good deal smaller than the majorities achieved in 1997 and 2001. That majority effectively means that there is no difference between parliamentary oversight and Government diktat. The amendment is perhaps a desperate attempt by the Opposition to get greater oversight of what the Government do in our name.
Subsection (1) reads:
“The Secretary of State must appoint a Commissioner to be known as the National Identity Scheme Commissioner.”
That is all very well, but I urge the Government to allow Parliament a rather greater say in affairs of state from time to time. I will be interested to hear what they have to say on that.

Tony McNulty: As ever, I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his brevity. He should not be timid: if he wants Divisions, let us have Divisions. There is plenty of time. We are not rushing towards an impending deadline. More time has been made available, so he can have Divisions at his leisure.
I do not mean to detain the Committee unduly on this amendment, but let me just say that since the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life reported, all Government appointments have been made under the auspices of the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, at Parliament’s behest. Given the existence of the commissioner, we do not feel it necessary for the national identity scheme commissioner to be appointed only by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The national identity scheme commissioner will be appointed by the Secretary of State. The standard rules on public appointments will apply and there are untold precedents for such an arrangement—not only in other Departments, but in the Home Office.
The surveillance commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with Scottish Ministers, the intelligence services commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minister and the immigration services commissioner is appointed by the Secretary of State. All are appointed under the auspices discussed and agreed by Parliament according to the Nolan report on standards in public life. That is more than a sufficient safeguard: the process is as open to scrutiny and as transparent as such things can be.
Nothing would be achieved by going down the route suggested by the amendment. I hazard a guess that if any other Government were in power, they would make such an appointment in the prescribed manner laid down by Parliament rather than by resolution in both Houses. For those reasons, the amendment is unnecessary. I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw it.

Edward Garnier: Gosh, I am persuaded by the Minister as far as this: I shall withdraw my amendment. None the less, the balance between the Executive and Parliament is out of kilter and needs to be reformed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 219, in clause 24, page 21, line 27, after “cards”, insert “and the ID Register”.
This amendment is simple, but it begs an important question. I fail to understand why we did not get on to debating the substantive matter of identity cards until seven clauses had first been discussed. That led to comments from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough and others that the Bill, which we hope will not become an Act, although no doubt it will, should be termed the national identity register Bill.
It seems curious that the register should suddenly be left out of an important paragraph of clause 24, which involves us talking about the important issue of the appointment of the national identity scheme commissioner. I do not want to beg the point; with the simple addition of the words in the amendment, we would begin to refocus ourselves on the fact that we are talking about not only a little bit of plastic that nobody can compel us to carry and that we will not be required to surrender when someone asks for it, but the fact that there will be a national register, the objections to which we have already discussed at length. Adding those simple words would help to make things a little simpler.

Tony McNulty: The amendment is simply unnecessary. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of clause 24(2) cover in detail all that is laid out in the legislation and the commissioner’s role in relation to the register. They do not cover
“the uses to which ID cards are being put”,
which is why paragraph (d) is there. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) cover the whole gamut of the Bill as the domain within which the commissioner should carry out his or her role. Adding mention of the national register to  paragraph (d) would at least confuse and at worst obfuscate to the point of being an art form. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Patrick Mercer: We all appreciate art forms in every style that the Minister suggests. Sadly, however, what he is saying is not correct. The amendment would add considerably to the clause, rather than detract from it, but given the fact that we are trying only to add a couple of extra words, and in light of what he said about paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in clause 24, page 21, line 28, leave out from ‘Commissioner’ end of line 43 and insert
‘include general policy matters, but do not include—
‘(a)the exercise of powers which under this Act are exercisable by statutory instrument or by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I.1979/1573 (N.I.12)) unless any particular case affected by these powers or rules raises a concern of substantial public interest;
(b)the imposition of civil penalties, objections to such penalties or appeals against them, unless a particular penalty, objection or appeal raises a concern of substantial public interest;
(c)the operation of so much of this Act or of any subordinate legislation as imposes or relates to criminal offences in any particular case, unless a particular case raises a concern of substantial public interest;
(d)the provision of information to the Director-General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service or the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters in any particular case, unless the provision of information in any particular case raises a concern of substantial public interest; or
(e)the provision to another member of the intelligence services, in accordance with regulations under section 23(5), of information that may be provided to that Director-General, Chief or Director in any particular case, unless the provision of information in any particular case raises a concern of substantial public interest.’.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 184, in clause 24, page 21, line 28, leave out ‘do not’ and insert ‘shall also’.
No. 81, in clause 24, page 21, line 29, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c).
No. 220, in clause 24, page 21, line 36 , after second ‘service’, insert
‘the Chief Executive of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency’.
No. 82, in clause 24, page 21, line 43, at end insert—
‘(3A)‘The Commissioner may, where appropriate—
(a)before undertaking a review which include the policy towards the provision of information to the Director-General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service or the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters, liaise with the Intelligence Services Commissioner with a view to referring responsibility for that review to that Commissioner, or
(b)liaise with the Information Commissioner in relation to any processing of personal data.’.

Edward Garnier: We are concerned with the commissioner’s ability to oversee the work of the Secretary of State, the administration of the ID register and the identity card scheme. The amendments deal with clause 24(3), which begins:
“The matters to be kept under review by the Commissioner do not include”,
after which various exceptions are listed. Why are those exceptions not included? Although there will be good reasons why a national identity scheme commissioner should not consider particular cases, he should have oversight on a thematic basis. Amendment No. 80 would permit the commissioner to take a general oversight of policy matters, but it would expressly exclude from that general thematic oversight the matters set out in its proposed paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), which would be substituted for the current wording. I hope that the Committee shares our view that it does not take much imagination to see that that is a sensible, proper thing for the commissioner to do, and that it does not detract from the powers that the Secretary of State wishes to give to himself in relation to his official functions.
I will leave it to my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale to deal with amendment No. 184.
Amendment No. 81 would delete paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (3). The thrust of the arguments that I would deploy on that amendment is the same as in relation to amendment No. 80.
Amendment No. 220 would add the chief executive of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency to paragraph (d), in addition to the director general of the Security Service, the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service or the director of Government Communications Headquarters. If the Government are serious about what they intend, surely they should employ all the heads of the relevant police or security services in the detection and prevention of serious crime. Either that is an oversight, or there is some magic in the poor man’s not being included in this subsection.
Amendment No. 82 would add new subsection 3A, which says:
“The Commissioner may, where appropriate ... before undertaking a review which include the policy towards the provision of information to the”
various directors general,
“liaise with the Intelligence Services Commissioner with a view to referring responsibility for that review to that Commissioner ... or liaise with the Information Commissioner in relation to any processing of personal data.”
That is a sensible cross-directors general liaison. There may be matters that affect that aspect of the security services in a way that should not be limited to one service head. If the commissioner thinks it appropriate, surely he should be able to refer to the intelligence services commissioner the review that he is undertaking. I cannot for the life of me see why that should be objectionable to the Government, any more than I can see why proposed subsection (3A)(b), which amendment No. 82 seeks to add to the Bill, should be.
The matter is one of sensible, thematic oversight. The amendment does not seek to interfere with the courts or with the discretion of the Secretary of State, although I object to the way in which the Secretary of State is giving himself huge discretion under the Bill. It seeks to provide sensible and dispassionate oversight of a growing area of interference in the life of the individual.

Tim Farron: Given that it is my first opportunity to do so, I thank the Minister for his kind words last week in observing my absence because of important constituency business in the north-west. [Interruption.]

Jimmy Hood: Order.

Tim Farron: I did not say which constituency in the north-west.
I wish to speak in favour of amendment No. 184, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland. I will do so briefly. The amendment would alter subsection (3) by altering “do not” to “shall also” to widen the powers of the commissioner.
Given the controversial nature of the register and the Government’s sincere desire to allay our fears, which are shared by many people outside this place, we think that it is odd to restrict the role of the commissioner so much. It is interesting that the commissioner will be able to review only general structural issues, not individual complaints or cases, or how the scheme operates in practice. For example, the commissioner will be excluded from considering the imposition of fines, criminal offences relating to identity cards and information provided to the security services and the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ.
Given the culture-changing nature of the Bill and the register, it is ridiculous not to give the commissioner the opportunity to have a more far-reaching role and the ability to consider the operation of the scheme that he or she is there to monitor. I would be grateful if the Minister took that into account.

Nick Palmer: I seek some clarification from the hon. and learned Member for Harborough. Under the Government’s proposal, it would be possible—I suggest that it would also be natural—for the commissioner to report on the extent to which civil penalties were being applied, including on whether they were increasing or decreasing and so on. In amendment No. 80, the Opposition specifically rule that out. In the Government’s version, only “appeals against civil penalties” are ruled out. In the Conservative version,
“the imposition of ... penalties, objections to such penalties or appeals against them”
are all ruled out. I wonder why.

Ben Wallace: I would like some clarification. I speak in support of amendment No. 184, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, whom I welcome back to the Committee. He is my neighbour in the north-west, and I am sure that the  good people of Westmorland and Lonsdale will be delighted to hear that their new MP enjoyed Cheadle so much.
It is important to ask why the Minister chose to narrow the functions of the commissioner and to limit the areas that he or she can consider. I ask him to clarify that point. I am aware that a number of these agencies already have their own commissioners for oversight, but it is a broad responsibility for the individual commissioners to analyse the use of the database. The proposed commissioner will be best positioned to understand the issue in the round, where the weaknesses are being exposed and where abuse of the system has taken place. Will the Minister clarify that point?

Tony McNulty: Simply put, all matters outlined in subsection (3) are broadly either subject to parliamentary scrutiny or fall within the jurisdiction of the courts or within the remit of another commissioner. Their exclusion, as proposed by subsection (3), is intended to avoid doubt and confusion, and to add clarity. The notion that the provision is somehow a mischievous way of restricting and narrowing the commissioner’s remit and his oversight of the project outlined in the Bill is complete nonsense. If that is the best that the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale can do, perhaps he should have stayed in Cheadle.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough offered more serious comments in his amendment. He accepted the premise that many areas fall within the jurisdiction of others, while he still sought to place broader policy matters and other items within the remit of the commissioner. His points were better made than those in the schoolboy amendment that we have just dispatched.
None the less, for good reasons, those matters still go beyond the remit of the national identity scheme commissioner. Amendment No. 80 would add to the remit of the commissioner general policy matters and areas that are excluded from his remit, if they are a matter of substantial public interest. I am grateful that the amendment recognises that those matters should be excluded, and also that they should be admitted only if they are of substantial public interest. None the less, the amendment is unnecessary, and subsection (3) should remain in its totality.
Amendment No. 82 should be read in conjunction with amendment No. 80, as the hon. and learned Gentleman suggested. Amendment No. 82 would first allow the commissioner, when undertaking a review of the provision of information to the intelligence agencies, to liaise with the intelligence services commissioner with a view to referring responsibility for that review to him. The amendment would also allow the national identity scheme commissioner to liaise with the Information Commissioner about the processing of personal data.
The role of the national identity scheme commissioner was drafted following our consultations about the draft Bill. It is important that the powers in the Bill can be appropriately scrutinised, but it is also important that we use the resources available to us  appropriately. The reason for excluding the matters listed in subsection (3) from the role of the commissioner is that those parts of the Bill are already subject to independent scrutiny by Parliament, the judiciary or the intelligence services commissioner.
The amendment is important, and I want to take each of its elements in turn. First, the exercise of powers by means of statutory instrument or statutory rule in Northern Ireland would be subject to parliamentary oversight. Secondly, appeals against civil penalties would be a matter for the civil courts. Thirdly, the criminal offences that are dealt with would be a matter for the criminal courts. Fourthly, the provision of information to the intelligence services would be subject to oversight of the intelligence services commissioner and the investigatory powers  tribunal dealt with in clause 26. Finally, the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to passports under clause 39 would not be connected with identity cards or the register.
There are clear reasons why each item should be excluded. To talk about the matter in terms of narrowing or restricting the role of the commissioner, as the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale did, is not appropriate. The Bill provides adequate and more appropriate scrutiny of the excluded functions, as I have just outlined, and as such, amendments Nos. 184 and 81 are unnecessary. Amendment No. 80 would provide that the commissioner should have the oversight that I have discussed.

It being One o’clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned till this day at Four o’clock.